Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship

2018

Contract and the Problem of Fickle People
Aditi Bagchi
Fordham University School of Law, abagchi@law.fordham.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Contracts Commons
Recommended Citation
Aditi Bagchi, Contract and the Problem of Fickle People, 53 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1 (2018)
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/921

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

W03_BAGCHI.DOCX

(DO NOT DELETE)

4/21/18 7:39 PM

CONTRACT AND THE PROBLEM OF FICKLE PEOPLE
Aditi Bagchi*

Most theories of promise and contract hold that these
practices enhance our autonomy. This Article argues that
such theories are excessively optimistic about the relationship
between autonomy and long-term commitment. Because we
continuously revise our values and plans, voluntary
obligations enable earlier plans and express older values at
the expense of updated plans and values. The challenge of
individual moral discontinuity plays out differently for the
morality of promise and contract, respectively.
This Article first recasts moral discontinuity, or
fickleness, as a valuable moral feature of persons, albeit one
that is in tension with other moral interests. Agents with
active moral faculties under conditions of incomplete
information should continually revise the commitments that
motivate particular promises. In fact, even commitments
simultaneously held by a single agent may be inconsistent
with each other. These limitations of consistency and
continuity reflect persistent agency.
Individuals differently prioritize stability and
consistency, on the one hand, and revision and growth, on the
other. Each of us can navigate the practice of promise to
strike a personal balance between these values. Similar
calibration is not possible within contract, however. The legal
regime of contracting in a liberal state should not undertake
to enforce a promise for its own sake, lest it underwrite a thick
conception of personhood that favors moral stability over
moral evolution. Contract law must locate its justification
elsewhere. Indeed, American contract law avoids embracing
any dogmatic theory of the relationship between autonomy
and contract.

*. Professor of Law, Fordham University Law School. J.D. Yale Law
School; M.Sc. Oxford University; A.B. Harvard College. Many thanks for
feedback received at presentations at American University Washington College
of Law, Fordham Law School, Harvard Law School, the University of Amsterdam,
and Yale Law School. I am particularly grateful for comments from Hanoch
Dagan, Abner Greene, Martijn Hesselink, Dori Kimel, David Synder, and
Benjamin Zipursky.
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I. INTRODUCTION

We often understand promise and contract as practices that
promote autonomy.1 By making a promise or entering into a contract,
we are able to alter our moral and legal position, respectively, merely
by expressing an intention to do so. You are not obligated to pick up
your friend from the airport on a given occasion until you promise to
do so. You are not obligated to refrain from disparaging a company’s
products until you agree not to as its employee. Most of what we owe
each other does not depend on our communicated intentions in this
way. Similarly, most of our legal duties to others do not depend on a
communicated intent to assume them. Obligations of our own
deliberate making are unique.
Why recognize the power to bind ourselves in this way? The
promise to help your friend advances your friendship and the promise
not to disparage your employer makes it possible to access
employment. More generally, David Owens has argued persuasively
that “normative powers”2 like promise allow us to author our
normative world, rendering it more of our making.3 When we actively
shape our normative position, we exercise a distinctive dimension of
our moral agency. The resulting responsibility for our moral position
is important to our self-conception as agents. Whether we are
responsible for what we owe others is not a metaphysical fact; it
depends on whether we take each other to be responsible. By treating

1. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 14 (1981) (arguing that when one promises it increases
one’s future “options,” which in turn promotes autonomy); Jody S. Kraus, The
Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603, 1617 (2009)
(“On the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy, promisors are held
morally accountable for their promises out of respect for their right to choose to
undertake moral commitments as they see fit.”); Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism, 117 PHIL. REV. 481, 502
(2008) (“An autonomous life requires . . . meaningful, moral relations with
others. Meaningful, moral relations depend on agents having the ability to make
binding promises.”).
2. Neil MacCormick & Joseph Raz, Voluntary Obligations and Normative
Powers, 46 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 79, 93–94 (1972).
3. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE 25 (2012).
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promises and other exercises of normative power as binding, we
construct our own agency.
But the binding character of promise and contract is constrictive
too. In fact, on their face, promise and contract reduce the choices
available to us in the future.4 Because you promised to pick up your
friend, you can no longer spend the afternoon reading, running, or
staring at the wall, even if you later decide that one of those is a better
way to spend the afternoon. Because you agreed not to disparage your
employer, you may not share views that you come to hold deeply about
the place where you spend most of your time. Scholars of promise and
contract have tended to conclude that because we bind ourselves
through those practices, the constrictive effect of promise and
contract does not pose a threat to autonomy. Pursuant to the
prevailing view, the power to put ourselves in a new moral position
enhances our autonomy even if we find ourselves newly encumbered.5
Such optimism about promise and contract is excessive. This
Article does not set out to deny that the normative power to make
promises and contracts enhances our moral agency. But that benefit
comes at a cost. The same ideal of moral agency that makes promise
valuable makes the power to revise and reject commitments that we
have made valuable too. In fact, the power to revise and reject
recognizes an important feature of our agency: it is persistent. That
is, because we are persistent agents, we continuously revisit our
values and ends. We can and should act in a manner that reflects our
new assessments.
Of course, the human tendency to break promises and breach
contracts reflects a variety of weaknesses, including the bare
temptation of self-interest. We might fail to follow through on a
promise because we have already obtained the advantage we sought
in making the promise and see nothing to gain from performance. Or
we might regret an agreement because we learn new facts that reveal
it to have been a bad deal for us. Arguably, the assignment of risk in
contract is intended precisely to deal with this sort of painful
resolution to factual uncertainty. However, we also break promises

4. Self-imposed obligations are only one of the ways in which we may be
burdened by our former selves. See, e.g., RICHARD WOLLHEIM, THE THREAD OF
LIFE 130–32 (Yale Univ. Press 1999) (1984) (describing the potential
psychological tyranny of memory). But they are unusual because the practice of
recognizing self-imposed obligations as binding depends on the positive
contribution of the practice to our autonomy, all things considered. By contrast,
the tyranny of memory is a psychological fact that does not depend on our
conclusion that memory serves us well (though we might agree that our
personhood would be even more compromised without memory). See infra Part
III (comparing the self-imposed obligation with involuntary duties).
5. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 16–17.
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and breach contracts because we have changed our minds in a morally
significant way.6
We often change our minds about the commitments we have
made because we reject some value on which the commitment was
based—a life plan, a relationship—or because we reassess the balance
of the same reasons we had previously considered.7 Even a decision
to breach that appears at first blush to be a momentary failure of will
likely reflects some underlying ambivalence in our reasoning about
the agreement. At a critical moment, we might revive reasons that
we earlier rejected or had previously judged to be outweighed by other
reasons.8 Our tendency to change our minds is easily dismissed as
fickleness because the internal processes that result in a change of
mind are often opaque to others.9 All that others see is the same
person doing something different.10 A change in behavior will appear
sudden, even though the reasons for the change have been
accumulating for an agent for some time before the reasons reached
tipping weight. Of course, some people are more sympathetic to
change in others and will project reasonable uncertainty that they
cannot directly observe. Similarly, some cultures are more tolerant
than others of such “multiplicity” within a single person and her life.11
Regardless of our particular dispositions, we all know from
subjective experience that we change our minds because we are still
thinking. And, as agents, we aim to translate our new thoughts into
6. Throughout this Article, I will refer to (changes in our) values, ends, and
identity as “normative” or “moral” matters. It can be useful to distinguish
questions about what we owe each other from questions about what we care
about. See HARRY G. FRANKFURT, The Importance of What We Care About, in THE
IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT 80, 80–81 (1998). Nevertheless, although
self-regarding questions of value, virtue, and identity may not be strictly moral
in the sense of defining our duties to others, they are normative and even moral
in the more general sense that they entail “strong evaluation.” See CHARLES
TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF MODERN IDENTITY 4 (1989).
Moreover, ultimately, the way we construct our own identities has too many
implications for how we treat others to draw a sharp boundary between these
matters; questions of identity have a critical moral dimension. Id. at 28–29.
7. Cf. Monika Betzler, Sources of Practical Conflicts and Reasons for Regret,
in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 197, 198 (Peter Baumann
& Monika Betzler eds., 2004) (distinguishing regret over right decisions from
regret over wrong decisions).
8. Cf. ALFRED R. MELE, IRRATIONALITY: AN ESSAY ON AKRASIA, SELFDECEPTION, AND SELF-CONTROL 3–6 (1987) (discussing varieties of akratic action).
9. See Simon Blackburn, Has Kant Refuted Parfit?, in READING PARFIT 180,
180–81 (Jonathan Dancy ed., 1997) (noting that the problem of personal identity
is a first-person problem); see also Gottlob Frege, The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,
65 MIND 289, 310–11 (1956) (explaining that one can grasp thoughts about
oneself that one cannot communicate and that others cannot grasp).
10. For a discussion of whether actions can be true, false, or inconsistent and
how irrationality might figure in practical reasoning, see DAVID PEARS,
MOTIVATED IRRATIONALITY 121–26 (1984).
11. See ROM HARRE, THE SINGULAR SELF: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONHOOD 148–49 (1998).
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new action. The reasoning behind a change can be careless or careful,
just as our initial commitments are sometimes careless and
sometimes careful. Either case is an exercise of practical reason, the
capacity for which defines us as moral agents.12 Persistent agency is
thus a morally valuable capacity, and it deserves accommodation. I
will argue below that the practice of promise cannot accommodate
persistent agency within itself, but the institution of contract can. It
should, and it does.
To be sure, contract law does not entitle us to impose losses on
others so that we might indulge our fickleness. But in several
respects, contract law is more lenient than its private counterpart—
the morality of promise.13 Promise-making befits individuals who are
committed to moral stability and prepared to undertake its weighty
obligations. Many of us choose to exercise normative power over time
at the expense of constricting our persistent agency—at least in some
areas of our lives. Others might self-consciously take steps to avoid
moral encumbrances. Because we are all equally entitled to the
support that contract law provides in our daily lives, it is a more
liberal institution than promise. Contract law facilitates commitment
without endorsing any one conception of personal virtue over others.
Many scholarly discussions of promise and contract elaborate
their relationships with the principle of autonomy. By contrast, this
Article’s focus is on the broader concept of agency. I should therefore
specify how I use each concept. I take a moral agent to generate
reasons for herself and others. She is an agent in that she is not
merely responsive to external facts but processes facts in a way that
makes her decision to act in one way rather than another her own.14
Because she is a moral agent, her choices reflect moral deliberation,
or they should.15 And just as she ought to take into account the moral
claims of others, her interests are of the sort that should be given
special weight (as compared to other beings) by other moral agents.
12. See RICHARD MORAN, AUTHORITY AND ESTRANGEMENT: AN ESSAY ON SELFKNOWLEDGE 114–18 (2001).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. My use of the concept of agency is consistent with standard theories of
agency. See G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION 9 (Cornell Univ. Press 1969) (1957)
(explaining that intentional actions are those for which the agent answers “Why?”
with a reason for acting); DONALD DAVIDSON, Agency, in ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND
EVENTS 43, 46 (2d ed. 2001) (“[A] man is the agent of an act if what he does can
be described under an aspect that makes it intentional.”); see also MYLES BRAND,
INTENDING AND ACTING: TOWARD A NATURALIZED ACTION THEORY 3–5 (1984)
(“Whenever an action includes the casual consequences of the agent’s bodily
movements, observation is necessary for him to know what he is doing.”);
MICHAEL BRATMAN, INTENTION, PLANS, AND PRACTICAL REASON 128–29 (1987)
(contemplating the relation between acting with an intention and intending);
ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 103–04 (hardcover ed. 2016).
15. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency:
A Kantian Response to Parfit, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 101 (1989) (noting that
the moral agent asks, “What should I do?” (emphasis added)).
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I take autonomy to be a more robust principle: an autonomous
person governs herself by reference to the right reasons.16 That is, a
person can fail to act autonomously where she does not act on the
moral reasons that apply to her. Although autonomy is often used
more broadly to encompass what is here either agency or the capacity
for autonomy, I am using a more restrictive conception of autonomy
in order to be able to distinguish systematically between our moral
interest in exercising agency and our interest in exercising it well.
Nevertheless, both agency and autonomy drive at the idea of selfauthorship, and such self-authorship is facilitated by promising.
Only if we share a conception of the person that is well-served by the
power to promise does the law of contract have noninstrumental
reasons for helping to construct the normative power of promise in
the context of legally binding exchange.
A few years ago, Dori Kimel wrote a book chapter wondering
whether the autonomy-enhancing effects of promise have caused us
to overlook or downplay (in theory, at least) the obvious downsides of
commitment for autonomy.17 People can bind themselves until they
are too bound up. Does autonomy not require that we retain the right
to change our minds?
Kimel considers a number of problems that promise might pose
for autonomy, but I will argue that he does not do the challenge
justice. His account is thrown off by adopting the starting point of the
literature on promise: only a morally continuous and unitary person
can be autonomous.18 Starting there, Kimel misjudges the value of
changing one’s mind and its relation to a fragmented and
discontinuous identity.19
The idea of autonomy that Kimel employs presupposes a more
basic moral agency. Because persistent agency is in basic tension
with commitments across time, the implications of promising for
autonomy are more ambiguous than Kimel allows. The power to
promise is valuable, but normative powers outside promise have
value too; the power to make a promise sits tightly against the power
to revise that promise. The same ambition of agency that motivates
the basic normative power of promise motivates us to revise our
commitments in light of evolving values that may coexist in tension
16. The relationship between agency and autonomy is variously conceived
but agency is treated here as the prior notion, a prerequisite for autonomy. The
idea of autonomy employed is Kantian; it is more demanding than some popular
uses. See IMMAUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 40–44
(James W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 3d. ed. 1993) (1785) (identifying
autonomy with self-governance by universalizable maxims, i.e., with a
substantive moral principle, the categorical imperative).
17. See Dori Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change of Mind in Promise and
in Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 96, 96–99
(Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
18. See id. at 99–103 (discussing personal autonomy and a change of mind).
19. Id.
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with each other. Revision and internal conflict are what we call
fickleness. We may conceive ourselves as continuous persons, but we
rightly accommodate our fickleness too.
Part II summarizes and suggests limitations in Kimel’s
arguments “in defense” of promise and contract in the face of the
value of changing one’s mind. In doing so, my aim is to show the scope
of the challenge here, which applies not only to bad promises but also
promises per se. Part III argues that agency under nonideal
conditions, including limited cognitive faculties and limited
knowledge, requires continuous revision of our basic moral
commitments. Some degree of indecision is morally compulsory. Part
IV suggests that people reasonably disagree about the value of
stability and unity and makes sense of why promise and contract
should diverge in their treatment of regret and reversal. Promise is
properly associated with continuity of a singular identity and contract
appropriately declines to presuppose such a conception of the person.
This divergence is good, especially in a liberal state. Part V discusses
several doctrines that accommodate fickleness.
II. DORI KIMEL’S DISCUSSION OF CHANGING ONE’S MIND
Surprisingly, Kimel’s inquiry is the only extended philosophical
discussion of this intuitive challenge to modern contract theory.
Kimel begins by setting out the worry that the implications of promise
for autonomy are more mixed than the literature on promise has
allowed.20 If it turns out that promises are bad for autonomy, then on
his nonconventional view of promise, the idea of promise is just
illusory—the moral practice exists only if it is endorsable from a
moral standpoint. If promise undermines autonomy, there is no such
thing as promise.
Kimel sets out to redeem promise and quell fears about
contract.21 Although making commitments and changing your mind
are both valuable exercises of autonomy, he does not regard them as
equally important. The value of autonomy, he claims, lies in the
persistent and significant, not the fleeting and trivial.22 He associates
our interest in changing our mind with spontaneity and associates
spontaneity with the fleeting and trivial. Autonomy dictates a moral
interest in controlling weighty matters that affect the arc of one’s life.
Promise enhances that capacity at the expense of frivolous indecision.
Kimel himself is not wholly satisfied with that defense of
promise. It rests, after all, on a dubious empirical view of what kinds
of decisions people are likely to revise.23 More problematically, it
discounts the value of changing one’s mind per se as distinct from the

20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 96–99.
Id. at 99.
See id.
See id. at 100.
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value of changing one’s mind about this or that matter.24 Kimel offers
two additional arguments for why promise might not unduly burden
the moral interest in changing one’s mind: promisors have the power
to make promises fault based, and they operate in relationships
where promisees are obligated to release promisors where a promise
turns out to be regrettable.25
Kimel argues that a promisor’s power to moderate her
commitment attenuates the burden of promise.26 A promisor that
does not wish to commit herself wholly can promise only “to try” or
she can promise that she will perform only under specified
conditions.27 Unfortunately, though this possibility does make
promise less burdensome, it also seems to make it less valuable. And,
in any event, it does not release the later self from the power of the
former self since it is up to the former self to hedge the promise. A
promisor who suspects that the promise she is about to make may
turn out to be a bad idea can indeed avoid implicating herself too
much, but a promisor with no such doubts will not take advantage of
the opportunity to condition her own promise or limit its scope. Even
where she does, she necessarily limits her promissory obligation by
reference to some external constraint (“I promise I will pick you up
unless I have a work conflict”); the contingency could not be within
her own control (“I promise I will pick you up unless I come to decide
that you are not worth the trouble.”). The latter type of promise is
illusory, in the language of contract. Even hedging by reference to
external constraint may undermine the relational value of the
promise substantially. A promise hedged by retaining the bare right
to change one’s mind is an affirmatively negative signal. Kimel may
be right that promisors have wide-ranging formal powers with respect
to their promises, but they are more constrained if they wish to avail
themselves of the relational value associated with promise in the first
place.
The last mitigating consideration Kimel identifies in defense of
promise is the duty of promisees to release promisors from promises.28
That duty is not one that attaches by virtue of their status as
promisees (though that status gives them the power of release) but in
light of the relationships in which promising usually takes place.29
Kimel suggests that in most cases where a promise turns out to be
especially burdensome, the promisor has a right of release by the
promisee.30 Presumably, in the context of contractual promises, the
duty to release is manifested in doctrines of excuse.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 100–01.
Id. at 109–11.
Id. at 106.
Id.
Id. at 109–11.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 109–10.
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This argument too assumes certain kinds of reasons for wanting
release from a promise. In particular, those reasons have to be ones
that objectively justify breaching the promise, such that the promisee
has objective reason to release the promisor from it. Kimel’s
argument does not contemplate the possibility of changing one’s mind
where that change of mind is triggered not by a change in the world
(or information about it) but by a change in oneself. It might
sometimes be the case that a promisee will respond to even the latter
kind of change, but she is unlikely to be bound to release for that
reason (morally or legally). This is especially true where the relevant
change in oneself is precisely a desire to rupture relations with the
promisee or at least a devaluation of her consideration in an
exchange.
Kimel’s defense of contract, or its implications for autonomy, is
more persuasive than his defense of promise. He again identifies
three ways in which contract takes into account the value of changing
one’s mind.31
First, “[i]t is plausible to think that entirely
unreciprocated undertakings are particularly likely to become the
object of a change of mind, or that the capacity to act on a change of
mind of this sort merits particularly robust protection.”32 Because
contract law, by virtue of the consideration requirement, enforces
primarily exchange agreements, most contractual promises are
reciprocal.33 It is not clear why one would be less likely to regret a
commitment made for exchange, but Kimel seems right; there is less
reason to allow one to change one’s mind in that context. Although a
promisee might rely on a unilateral promise, the state’s interest in
facilitating exchange because of the material benefits of a regime that
allows for cheap, credible commitments justifies its enforcing
commitments on which one might wish to backtrack. I expand on this
point in Part IV.
Second, Kimel observes that contract does not enforce the
promise but only the performance interest.34 This is because in most
cases, courts do not award specific performance.35 Seana Shiffrin has
critiqued this divergence between the rules of contract and the
ostensible moral rule that promisors must actually perform.36 Kimel
seems to imply that the obligation to make the other party whole is
less burdensome to a contracting party than an obligation to
perform.37 That is presumably true since, if a party finds damages
more burdensome, they could just go ahead and perform (assuming

31. Id. at 114.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708, 709 (2007).
37. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114.
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the period for performance has not passed). But the rule that contract
usually only gives rise to damages is important also for doing just
what Shiffrin claims: sending a message that a party is not really
required to perform.38 Contrary to Shiffrin, that message is valuable
as a legal norm precisely because it allows that the attitude of
contract law toward a commitment is not so dogmatic as promissory
norms alone would suggest. In particular, as I argue further below,
contract can be regarded as accommodating other values derived from
autonomy, including an interest being able to reverse course.
Finally, Kimel points to the fact that freedom of contract is less
wide ranging than freedom of promise.39 We are not permitted to bind
ourselves in the most profound ways. We cannot sell ourselves into
slavery or indentured servitude.40 We cannot even agree not to work
for a competitor of an employer on overly broad terms.41 Contract is
restricted in myriad other ways. Sometimes it is restricted to protect
third parties42 and sometimes restrictions appear motivated by
cultural reasons,43 but sometimes courts and policymakers are
engaged in straightforward paternalism.44 It is paternalistic,
however, only if we assume continuity of the person. My discussion
below might provide us with a better response to the charge of
paternalism than does Kimel. Paternalism involves restricting a
person for her own benefit. Relaxing the assumption of continuity,
we can more easily justify protecting a later self from a former self.
The basic limitation in Kimel’s defense of promise and contract
from the standpoint of autonomy is that the value he acknowledges
in changing one’s mind is really just the value in changing one’s mind
about what turn out to be bad promises.45 In this respect, his view is
consistent with that of Stephen Smith, who defended rules limiting
contracts that impair future freedom on the perfectionist grounds
that such contracts interfere with promisors’ future well-being.46
Kimel and Smith justify excusing nonperformance and refusing to
enforce agreements, respectively, when there is something objectively
wrong with the initial promise.47
In fact, Kimel starts his defense of promise by discounting the
value of changing one’s mind per se, suggesting that spontaneity itself
does not rival the autonomy interest in the serious and long term, the

38. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 722.
39. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114.
40. Stephen A. Smith, Future Freedom and Freedom of Contract, 59 MOD. L.
REV. 167, 175 (1996).
41. Id. at 169.
42. Id. at 170.
43. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 98.
46. Smith, supra note 40.
47. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114; Smith, supra note 40, at 173.
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latter being well served by promise.48 The limitations on the burden
of promising that he identifies all apply where there is continuity
between the values of the person who made the promise and values
of the person bound to perform it.49 That is, the performing person is
not severely burdened if her values were in complete alignment with
those of the promising person because the promisor could hedge her
promise in the appropriate ways. To the extent the performing person
wishes to retain the relationships constructed by her former self, she
can take comfort in the duties those relationships impose on
promisees to release her from the promise where external
circumstances warrant such excuse. But none of the considerations
highlighted by Kimel mitigate the burden of promise on a promisor
who has truly changed her mind.
The challenge posed by the phenomenon of regret to the practice
of promise does not lie in the imperative to be responsive to objective
reasons for changing one’s mind about a particular promise. Just as
the value of making promises does not lie in conformity with the
reasons one might have for making a promise, the value of changing
one’s mind does not lie in the value of conforming with new reasons
not to keep it. Keeping one’s promise is valuable because it is
empowering, but we can shape our normative situation over time only
if we regard ourselves as continuous persons. As developed further
below, changing one’s mind is valuable because we also have reasons
to render ourselves discontinuous by revising our beliefs and values
over time. The presumption of continuity is not straightforwardly
good for autonomy. Moral agency is a sufficiently sweeping interest
that it is in some respects advanced by personal continuity even while
other aspects lead us to harbor multiple values and commitments in
an unstable hierarchy and sometimes in outright conflict with one
another.
While our usual notion of a moral agent presupposes that she
operates in the singular, an agent need not be unitary (in the sense of
cohesive or consistent) either in her beliefs or in the values she
endorses. We speak intelligibly of collective agents, whose goals and
preferences are in flux over time.50 In the political context, we
recognize a tension between the need for stable political institutions
and the accountability of democracies to their present populations.51
On the one hand, a stable constitution makes it possible to undertake
more elaborate national projects, including the institution building

48. Kimel, supra note 17, at 99.
49. Id. at 99–100.
50. See MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, Shared Intention, in FACES OF INTENTION:
SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 109, 110 (1999) (describing
intentions of structured social groups); MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 18
(Princeton Univ. Press 1992) (1989) (discussing plural subjects).
51. JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 55 (2001).
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necessary to comply with the demands of justice.52 On the other hand,
democracy seems to require that institutions and policies be
responsive to people’s changing values on even constitutional
questions.53 On the one hand, we desire some national unity in order
that political processes function and with the legitimacy of proximate
consensus on deep issues.54 On the other hand, we celebrate
divergent views and call ourselves liberal for not wishing difference
away.55 These are tensions we live with. We differ among ourselves
on the relative priority of the two competing values. Some people
advocate constitutional interpretation by reference to original
intent,56 while others call for “systematic instability” by way of
periodic constitutional convention and sunset provisions57 or other
means of updating the constitutional canon over time.58 Some people
are nostalgic for greater cultural homogeneity, while others call for
the most liberal definition of the demos.59 But few would deny, in
principle, either the values of stability and cohesion, on the one hand,
or change and diversity, on the other.
The same tension in our normative commitments applies to the
person. The natural person is more cohesive and stable than a
collective agent only by degree.60 Any given person has a complex

52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 174.
54. Id. at 70.
55. Id. at 68–69.
56. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV.
226, 243–59 (1988); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 6–7 (2015).
57. See Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 620 (2008) (describing various
institutional proposals for promoting constitutional change); see also John Dinan,
“The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation”: The Development of State
Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures, 62 REV. POL. 645, 646
(2000); Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 355 (1994); Robert J. Martineau, The Mandatory Referendum
on Calling a State Constitutional Convention: Enforcing the People’s Right to
Reform Their Government, 31 OHIO ST. L.J. 421, 422 (1970).
58. See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
105–17 (2014); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 80 (2010).
59. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 120–22 (1989)
(describing this tension and defining demos inclusively).
60. Although this Article does not concern itself with the problem of personal
identity as such—because I assume that the person who makes a promise is the
same as the one called upon to perform it—Derek Parfit’s exploration of the
complexities of psychological continuity were critical to establishing my starting
point, i.e., fragmentation and instability in individual thinking. Derek Parfit,
Personal Identity, in PERSONAL IDENTITY 199, 203 (John Perry ed., 2d ed. 2008)
(“A person’s mental history need not be like a canal, with only one channel. It
could be like a river, with islands, and with separate streams.”); see DEREK
PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 326–29 (1984) (discussing changing
commitments).
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conception of the good that is under constant revision.61 Because our
value set never arrives at a stable equilibrium, at any given moment
in time there are internal tensions, if not outright contradictions,
among our commitments.62 Some conflicts are between concrete
judgments and abstract principles. Some are among our theoretic
commitments (e.g., in our aspiration to rival virtues), and others are
among our judgments across contexts (we may be more relaxed in our
fidelity to a moral principle in one setting than in another). No one
has fully reconciled all her normative beliefs, though some are less
comfortable with eclecticism (or inconsistency) and others are more
insistent on consistency (or dogmatism). Importantly, these internal
conflicts are genuine internal moral conflicts (i.e., “practical
conflicts”).63 They are not merely conflicts between reason and
emotion; emotional responses are only relevant here if they are
endorsed or consciously adopted based on reasons.64 While the
possibility of “true” practical conflicts is an open philosophical
question, the inconsistency in our normative commitments that I
describe does not depend on the objective reality of the conflict. That
is, it might be the case that in every case where our normative
commitments conflict, one of those commitments is improper or
reflects false moral reasoning. If that were true (which I do not
believe), then any apparent conflict among our normative
commitments is illusory.65 But as elaborated in Part III below, we do
not engage in practical reasoning under ideal conditions. Even if it
were the case that there are no true practical conflicts, the human
condition subjects us to such conflict because we cannot resolve all
moral questions rightly or definitively as would be necessary to avoid
them.
The moral capacities we ascribe to persons in the Rawlsian
framework, i.e., a sense of justice and a capacity to have a conception

61. A person’s “conception of the good” is her life plan, rooted in philosophical
and religious belief as well as political and social doctrines. See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 127 (rev. ed. 1999). It is roughly her worldview, especially
her ideas about what is valuable.
62. I refer to inconsistency among our normative judgments and
commitments and not “self-inconsistency” in the psychological sense, whereby
one personal trait interferes with actualization of another, and it is the latter that
the person endorses. See Augusto Blasi & Robert J. Oresick, Self-Inconsistency
and the Development of the Self, in THE BOOK OF THE SELF: PERSON, PRETEXT, AND
PROCESS 69, 73 (Polly Young-Eisendrath & James A. Hall eds., 1987).
63. THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 128–29 (Canto ed. 1991).
64. I am following Joseph Raz here. See Joseph Raz, Personal Practical
Conflicts, in PRACTICAL CONFLICTS: NEW PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS, supra note 7, at
172, 177 (“The so-called conflict between reason and the passions is no such
thing . . . . [T]alk of such conflict refers to the degree to which one is inclined to
response to emotion-related reasons and to the degree to which one relies on one’s
reason in deciding what to do.”).
65. See Earl Conee, Against Moral Dilemmas, 91 PHIL. REV. 87, 87–97 (1982).
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of the good,66 are best understood as active capacities. Moral agency
does not consist of passive possession of a static set of beliefs about
either justice or the good. Having these capacities means exercising
them, and this implies in the ordinary life that the work-products of
these moral capacities are in perpetual flux. Because the exercise of
these moral capacities is central to our self-conception as autonomous
moral agents, we might even look askance at a person who seems
disinclined to subject her ends to scrutiny, unresponsive to the new
data on the human condition that each day supplies or wedded to a
value set whose simplicity belies the complexity of the world through
which those values should guide her.
Kimel is the first person since Farnsworth67 to give sustained
attention to the problem of changing’s one mind.68 It is surprising
that the philosophical literature on promise has rallied so completely
around the value to one’s autonomy of being bound. The aim here is
not to displace that general proposition but to put into focus a
countervailing story. It is also about autonomy, or values related to
autonomy. But my account will go farther back than Kimel in
questioning the presumption that autonomy presupposes a
continuous and stable self, such that normative powers that operate
on that presumption come at no cost from the standpoint of autonomy.
I will suggest instead that we do not have a single, stable identity
and, as agents subject to cognitive and experiential constraints, we
should not aspire to have one. The practice of promise may insist on
it, but contract law does not expect it of us.
III. AGENCY UNDER NONIDEAL CONDITIONS
Nothing in this Article should be taken to deny the importance of
a continuous self. The pragmatic ambitions of contract law, to
facilitate planning and coordination,69 assume that people have an
interest in their future states.70 Likewise, the foundational premise
of contract law, that people know what is good for them and are

66. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 19 (expanded ed. 2011).
67. See generally E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF
REGRETTED DECISIONS (1998) (discussing the general principles and legal rules
that permit a person to change their mind).
68. See generally Kimel, supra note 17 (discussing changing one’s mind in
promise and in contract).
69. See Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach:
New Defenses of the Expectation Interest, 97 VA. L. REV. 1939, 2003 (2011)
(explaining that contract’s moral and economic purpose is to “enable coordination
on neutral terms in an open and pluralist economic and political order”); see also
STANLEY I. BENN & RICHARD S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC
STATE 279 (1959); E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 7–9 (3d ed. 1999); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2d ed. 1989).
70. For a discussion of the implications of a reductionist account of personal
identity for self-interest theory, see generally Sydney Shoemaker, Parfit on
Identity, in READING PARFIT, supra note 9, at 135.
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usually the best guardians of their own (future) interests, assumes
continuity of contracting parties.71
Less parochially, the kind of life to which human beings
ordinarily aspire has direction and purpose, whether by design or
retrospective narrative. Our sense of agency is enhanced by seeing
things that happen to us as connected with choices we made. We
accept responsibility for what follows from those choices.72 Direction,
purpose, choice, and responsibility are all concepts that apply across
time: One directs her life over many series of actions.73 One has a
purpose with respect to actions not yet accomplished.74 One chooses
what to do going forward.75 And one is responsible for things that
happened already.76 If these concepts are central to our moral agency,
as their ubiquity in any discussion of autonomy and agency implies,
then we cannot do without some self that persists over time.
But that self cannot be too settled, or else it ceases to be an agent
in other respects. After all, at issue here is not personal identity in
the metaphysical sense.77 I am not addressing the metaphysical
questions of whether a human being is the same person over time and
by virtue of what.78 I refer to the identity of an agent in the sense of
a self-conception, the set of beliefs and values that motivate one’s
choice to do this and not that or to commit to one thing rather than
another.
Moral agents can have moral claims addressed to them and they
can make claims on others. In either case, the agent helps generate
reasons. As the addressee of other’s moral claims, she recognizes
their claims as reasons for herself. As a claimant on others, she
presents her reasons for recognition by others. The capacity to
71. Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 143–44
(2009).
72. See ZENO VENDLER, THE MATTER OF MINDS 118 (L. Jonathan Cohen ed.,
1984).
73. See George Wilson & Samuel Shpall, Action, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/action/ (explaining that actions are caused by
an agent’s “desires, intentions, and means-end beliefs”) (last updated Apr. 4,
2012).
74. See id. (“It is also important to the concept of ‘goal directed action’ that
agents normally implement a kind of direct control or guidance over their own
behavior.”).
75. See id. (explaining that agents act with “intentions for the future”).
76. See Andrew Eshleman, Moral Responsibility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.,
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/ (last updated Mar. 26,
2014) (discussing Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility and the notion that
agents are responsible for their voluntary actions).
77. Mark Johnston, Human Concerns Without Superlative Selves, in
READING PARFIT, supra note 9, at 149, 174–75 (noting that metaphysical claims
about personhood bear a contingent relationship with practical commitments).
78. For discussion of those questions, in addition to Parfit, supra note 60, see
generally Stephen Clark, How Many Selves Make Me?, in HUMAN BEINGS 213
(David Cockburn ed., 1991); and Kathleen Wilkes, How Many Selves Make Me?,
in HUMAN BEINGS, supra, at 235.
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generate reasons, or to be a self-generating source of value, depends
on our being recognized as capable of generating new value and on
recognizing reasons based on who we are now.79 Otherwise, we would
be mere vessels for a conception of the good authored by a former self.
Generating guiding values, or choosing a conception of the good, must
always be unfinished business or we would not properly be
characterized as having a capacity to generate value; we would be
better described as possessing values. And because recognition as a
moral agent requires that others recognize our generative capacity,
these new, revised commitments must have some moral significance
for where we stand in relation to others. Others must see us as
capable of moving around in and reshaping the normative landscape
(to use Owens’s phrase).80 This means they will expect some
discontinuity.81
Inconsistency is not just temporal. The process of moral change
does not involve wholesale substitution of one complete conception of
the good with another at neat intervals. We are in ongoing
deliberation; we do not actually achieve reflective equilibrium.82
Because we experience the world in fragments, at any given moment,
we too should be fragmented with commitments rising and falling in
priority, each competing for space in a value set thus deprived of
either constancy or cohesion. There is nothing tragic about this
responsiveness. It is an ideal of agency, or at least it follows from its
proper exercise. We might regard the diversity of views held by an
individual over time as characteristic of a free mind in the way that a
“reasonable plurality of conflicting and incommensurable
[conceptions of good in a society] is seen as the characteristic work of
practical reason over time under enduring free institutions.”83
Of course, not everything is properly subject to revision. We are
subject to myriad involuntary duties irrespective of what we think

79. See Lynne McFall, Integrity, in ETHICS AND PERSONALITY: ESSAYS IN
MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 79, 80 (John Deigh ed., 1992) (explaining that the virtue of
integrity demands as an ideal not only that we espouse the right principles but
“make our principles, conventional or otherwise, one’s own”); cf. Thomas M.
Scanlon, Reasons and Passions, in THE CONTOURS OF AGENCY: ESSAYS ON THEMES
FROM HARRY FRANKFURT 165, 180 (Sarah Buss & Lee Overton eds., 2002) (“What
we and others regard as particularly significant about us is the considerations we
regard as reasons and how we respond to them.”).
80. See OWENS, supra note 3, at 11.
81. See id. at 4–5 (explaining that when an agent communicates an intention
to impose an obligation on another, the agent is intentionally changing the
normative situation and must believe that the other party is capable of changing
his obligations).
82. “Reflective equilibrium” is the process by which we attempt to reconcile
our general beliefs and principles with our judgments about specific situations or
facts. RAWLS, supra note 61, at 20. Rawls suggests that we go back and forth
among these until the process “yields principles which match our considered
judgments duly pruned and adjusted.” Id.
83. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 135.
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about them—just as state powers are limited by universal human
rights irrespective of the policy agenda of a given government.84
Moreover, we may not renounce commitments we have undertaken to
others if doing so would harm them.85 None of these propositions is
troubled by the arguments here because the imperative to
accommodate fickleness is a challenge (ultimately withstood) to the
independent moral force of promises, not to the idea of obligation in
general. We do not recognize a duty to not harm others because it is
good for our own moral agency.86 But we do regard ourselves as bound
by promises just because we think that recognizing the power to bind
ourselves in that way is good for our moral agency. Normative powers
are uniquely susceptible to the challenge of fickleness because they
exist only inasmuch as they promote agency, and the phenomenon of
human fickleness suggests that their implications for agency are
more ambiguous than philosophers have allowed.87
In other words, fickle people (or rather, all people, because we are
all fickle to varying degrees) are subject to a duty not to harm others,
including by way of promise making and promise breaking.88 The
question is whether we should recognize an obligation to execute
promises just because we made them and not merely because
performance is morally commendable on other grounds, such as
avoiding harm or promoting good consequences.
Again, my
contention is not that promises are a poor moral practice all things
considered. We can choose whether and how to make promises, and
in which domains of our life. Promises are also probably more
conditional in practice than some theoretical accounts imply. For all
these reasons, the challenge of persistent agency can be attenuated,
though never diffused entirely. My claim here is not that promises
are never properly regarded as binding. Instead, I urge caution with
respect to the domain of promissory morality and insist that it not
encroach on contract.
84. SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONS: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL REASONING
123 (1998).
85. Marsalis v. La Salle, 94 So. 2d 120, 125 (La. Ct. App. 1957) (“One who
gratuitously undertakes with another to do an act or to render services which he
should recognize as necessary to the other’s bodily safety and thereby leads the
other in reasonable reliance upon the performance of such undertaking is subject
to liability to the other for bodily harm resulting from the actor’s failure to
exercise reasonable care to carry out his undertaking.” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 325 (AM. LAW. INST. 1934))).
86. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 114.
87. See Jennifer M. Morton, Deliberating for Our Far Future Selves, 16
ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 809, 823 (2013) (“Cross-temporal authority,
according to my view, is grounded in sharing a normative perspective with a
particular future self on what matters. Whether a current self will share a
normative perspective with a future self depends on the kind of reasons she has,
whether her future self will see those reasons, and crucially, whether he future
self will feel their force in a similar way.”).
88. See supra note 85.
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Thus far, I have emphasized the ways in which changing one’s
mind reflects the proper exercise of our moral faculties. However,
though responsiveness to new information and experiences is an
ideal, it does reflect the nonideal conditions under which we exercise
agency.89 If our capacity for reason were perfect and presented with
complete information about the external world, we might, in
principle, arrive at a stable set of values and beliefs that would
generate right reasons in all cases. In that state of the world, no new
information would require us to revise our existing views. Nor would
self-doubt motivate us to revise settled questions. As agents, we
would continue to generate reasons, but the reasons we generate
would be identical to the ones that we would have generated at any
earlier moment in time and the same as the ones we would recognize
at some later point.90 Because our exercise of agency is instead
inevitably flawed, we can expect the reasons we recognize today to be
somewhat different from the ones we recognized some time ago.91
If our capacity for reason were perfect, we could expect the
reasons we recognize at any given moment to be consistent with each
other. The set of beliefs that generate our reasons would be coherent,
as we would have brought them in perfect alignment with each other.
But our ability to conceive of the totality of our beliefs, let alone assess
them as a totality, is limited too. We do not always see the ways in
which our beliefs and values conflict or know how to resolve those
conflicts when we see them.92 Self-awareness might reduce some
conflict to uncertainty but some internal conflict will persist,
acknowledged or not.93 This disunity reflects, in part, the fact that
beliefs and values are updated in response to what we experience, and
this updating is a good thing—even if our limited faculties render the
process of updating incomplete. Given human limits, apparent
unanimity among a society of separate persons on deep questions of
life meaning and purpose is likely to reflect some oppressive social or

89. See Morton, supra note 87, at 812 (offering examples of the nonideal
conditions of agency, such as “irrationality” and “akrasia”).
90. See DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 62
(Sydney Shoemaker et al. eds., 1989) (“We appeal to an agent’s reasons for action
in explain her behavior.”).
91. See Morton, supra note 87, at 821 (“The agent’s confidence in deliberating
for her future self depends on her taking her future self to have a similar
normative perspective on the world as she does now, but if she is carving up all
of her current normative perspective through sheer acts of will how can she
assume that her future self will see things as she does?”).
92. See RAWLS, supra note 61, at 20 (“But if so and these principles match
our considered convictions of justice, then so far well and good. But presumably
there will be discrepancies.”).
93. See Caroline Goukens et al., Me, Myself, and My Choices: The Influence
of Private Self-Awareness on Choice, 46 J. MARKETING RES. 682, 690 (2009)
(“[S]elf-aware people are more conscious of their presence, attitudes, and
beliefs.”).
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political force.94 Similarly, the appearance of total internal cohesion
within a single person is likely to reflect either a failure to process
new data or a lack of self-awareness.95
In making choices, we rely on beliefs and values that we know
must be faulty but are nevertheless the best we can do at a given
moment in time.96 We have to rely on those beliefs and values to
generate reasons for action even as we revise them. Our revision may
be more or less deliberate; some will seek out revision while others
will resist it. But we cannot altogether refuse to revisit our beliefs
and values because we should know that they are probably incorrect.
Such a refusal to revisit would deny our own agency, in that it would
not undertake to generate reasons anew. And it would abandon the
aspiration to autonomy, or self-governance, by right reasons.
The idea that we should doubt our own beliefs and values and be
committed to revising them so that we can act on right reasons does
not presuppose any particular view of the objective status of those
reasons.97 One might think (though I do not) of the right reasons as
the best reasons out there to be discovered; our recognition of them
would amount to seeing them.98 In that case, we would expect each
attempt to discover right reasons to be somewhat off in the way that

94. Christoph Hanish, Acting Rightly for the Right Reasons: An Amendment
to Wolf’s Reason View, 42 TEOREMA: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE FILOSOFIA 55, 61
(2015).
95. JEFFREY B. RUBIN, A PSYCHOANALYSIS FOR OUR TIME: EXPLORING THE
BLINDNESS OF THE SEEING I 109 (1998) (“Not only is a monolithic sense of the self
limiting, but psychological health may involve access to, and comfort with, our
multidimensionality.
From this perspective, a sense of the complexity,
multidimensionality, and polyvalency of the self is a developmental milestone
and achievement.”). David Velleman also concludes from a philosophical
standpoint that “wholeheartedness is an object of wishes that do not necessarily
represent a healthy trend in our thought.” J. DAVID VELLEMAN, Identification and
Identity, in SELF TO SELF: SELECTED ESSAYS 330, 346 (2005). Although he regards
a coherent and consistent self as something we should aspire to, Velleman allows
that in the course of the internal debates by which we would try to arrive at
settled convictions, “we vacillate – which entails speaking in different voices, not
just hearing them.” J. DAVID VELLEMAN, The Voice of Conscience, in SELF TO SELF:
SELECTED ESSAYS, supra, at 110, 113.
96. See Morton, supra note 87, at 815 (“This would seem to suggest that in
deliberating for her far future self, an agent would consider her desires, or the
objects and states of affairs they present as valuable or good, as a basis on which
to make her decision. However, desires as we commonly understand them do not
have the cross-temporal authority needed for prospective deliberation.”).
97. For a range of views on related questions see, for example, ALFRED JULES
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH AND LOGIC 102–14 (2d ed. 1946); BLACKBURN, supra note
84, at 307; BRINK, supra note 90, at 14; DAVID B. WONG, MORAL RELATIVITY 1
(1984); James Dreier, Meta-Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism, 18
PHIL. PERSP. 23, 25 (2005); Philippa Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical
Imperatives 81 PHIL. REV. 305, 305 (1972); Gilbert Harman, Moral Relativism
Defended, 84 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1975).
98. Andrew Reisner, The Possibility of Pragmatic Reasons for Belief and the
Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, 145 PHIL. STUD. 257, 265 (2009).

W03_BAGCHI.DOCX

20

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

4/21/18 7:39 PM

[Vol. 53

we can expect each attempt to measure the length of a table precisely
to produce a somewhat different result, given the crudeness of our
tools as well as our perception.99 Alternatively, one might think that
there are many reasons that are right, in the sense of “not wrong,”
but still regard the question of rightness as a transcendental matter
outside the hands of agents.100 Still another way of thinking about
the effort to act on right reasons endows the agent with more
constructive power.101 Her reasons can be regarded as right insofar
as they are the result of perfect deliberation (i.e., inasmuch as they
reflect the proper use of her faculty of reason). We might go further
and say that right reasons may not be right from any universal
standpoint, but if they are right for the agent, she cannot be blamed
for acting on them.
We do not need to resolve these questions about the nature of
right reasons to endorse the more limited point on which I rely, which
is that people are properly motivated to revise their own reasons in
order to get them right. And they have reason to think that the
underlying beliefs and values that generate their reasons are
probably not correct in any relevant sense. The imperative to get it
right reflects our situation as agents, put in the position of always
choosing.102 It also derives from the principle of autonomy, which
directs us to govern ourselves not just by any reasons but by the right
ones.103
Although the principle of autonomy does important work in
explaining why we revisit existing beliefs and values, the idea of
agency helps get the problem started because it makes the activity of
choosing among reasons central to our self-conception. The idea that
we generate reasons for ourselves and others is sometimes collapsed
under the principle of autonomy.104 Autonomy, or self-governance by
reason, indeed presupposes an ability to generate reasons.105 But it
is worth separating out this aspect of self-authorship in the context of
promising and contract. It is because agency lies in our capacity to
generate reasons that it is not inevitable that my present reasons
coincide with my former reasons; those earlier reasons cannot be

99. See Stephen B. Vardeman et al., Elementary Statistical Methods and
Measurement Error, 64 AM. STATISTICIAN 46, 49 (2010) (“The difference between
devices is explained completely by the difference between the humans involved
in measurement.”).
100. Reisner, supra note 98, at 257.
101. See Suzy Killmister, Autonomy and False Beliefs, 164 PHIL. STUD. 513,
514 (2013) (“[I]t has been suggested than action is autonomous if it is performed
on the basis of a preference that has been vetted by an agent’s conception of the
good.”).
102. See Kraus, supra note 1, at 1608–09.
103. Id. at 1608.
104. See FRIED, supra note 1, at 1–2.
105. See Charles Fried, Contract as Promise Thirty Years On, 45 SUFFOLK
UNIV. L. REV. 961, 962–63 (2012).
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merely inherited. They have to be endorsed by myself as presently
constituted. Reasons created by the fact of promise exclude other
relevant reasons to keep or breach the promise only insofar as the self
that made the promise is authorized to bind the self called upon to
keep it. We might benefit, as Kimel concludes, from being able to
assert such authority over ourselves; and if it is just me that I am
binding, who is to object?106 The problem is that my agency precludes
us from treating me as just the same at a later time; 107 it forces the
possibility of rupture. The present self does not confront my earlier
reasons as entirely my own where I reject some of the beliefs and
values that underlay the initial commitment. These changes of mind
are not limited to facts concerning the substance of the promise or its
wisdom but may relate to any aspect of my identity implicated in the
choice to make that promise.
The tension created by agency over time may be obscured in most
contemporary discussions of autonomy—especially in law—which,
unlike the foundational Kantian work, tend to emphasize its
jurisdictional aspect.108 We emphasize the prerogative of the self to
decide and not the underlying capacities that justify that prerogative.
The principle of autonomy does not just reserve for me the right to
decide; it directs me to identify the right reasons and it allocates the
project of governing by reference to those reasons to me.109 The
jurisdictional side of autonomy, though, concerns only the boundaries
between people and the powers people have or ought not to have over
each other.110
Agency, by contrast, focuses on our relationship with the world
writ large.111 It does not adjudicate disputes between the rights of
people against each other but allocates responsibility as between the
active and the inert.112 Our former selves do not fall cleanly on the
106. Id. at 964–65 (“Most distinctive for both the law and economics analysis
of contracts and the morality of promising that underlies Contract as Promise is
the assumption that individuals (promising or contracting) have a certain
persistence as entities over time, so that what an individual chooses for his
future, he is choosing for himself, not for another person who may happen to have
the same name and DNA; and what he gets by that choice he may not complain
of, as if it had been chosen for him by someone else.”).
107. Again, at issue is not whether I am the same person in the metaphysical
sense or, more casually, whether we are talking about the same person. I refer
to whether the moral agent bears the same set of values and plans. It is the
difference, for example, between asking whether there has been a mix-up in the
parking garage such that the attendant has brought you someone else’s car and
asking whether the car is in the same condition that it was in at the time you
parked it. Only the latter sense of identity is at issue here.
108. See Fried, supra note 105, at 961–63 (describing the various
contemporary discussions of autonomy in the law).
109. See Kraus, supra note 1.
110. See Fried, supra note 105, at 961–70 (detailing opposing views of
autonomy in the law).
111. See NAGEL, supra note 63, at 37.
112. See id.
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side of the active or inert. They were active. It is not surprising, then,
that our interest in moral agency demands both fidelity and rebellion
against that former self.
IV. DIVERGENT TOLERANCE FOR FICKLENESS
Thus far, I have made fickleness out to be an unavoidable trait of
agents under nonideal conditions. But some of us are clearly more
fickle than others.
More importantly, this variation is not
unreflective. Although we sometimes characterize a person as fickle
because she regularly fails to control impulses that she does not
endorse, we also observe considered disagreement about how much
revision we should aspire to. Some people pride themselves on being
constant and only reluctantly let go of beliefs and values as they prove
untenable.113 They call it personal stability.114 Others pride
themselves on self-reinvention, shedding identities often.115 They call
it personal growth.116
There may be arguments for why a particular person is too fickle
or rigid, but there is almost certainly a range within which there is
reasonable disagreement. Agency cuts in both directions and we lack
the basis for radically prioritizing either the interest in expanding
normative powers or the interest in active pursuit of right reasons.117
Within this range, a state committed to neutrality among conceptions
of the good cannot take the position that the relative weight that an
individual assigns these interests is wrong. Our relative valuations
are better characterized as an important part of our respective selfconceptions.118 The relative weight we assign to constancy and
revision is a metapersonal value.
Although no single person is likely to endorse either stability or
instability in its purest form, particular practices may reflect one view
of the person at the expense of the other. The essential split I describe
is between a view of the person as unitary and stable, on the one hand,
and fragmented and unstable, on the other. In the remainder of this
Part, I will argue that a view of the person as essentially unitary and
stable underlies the practice of promise. But neither view dominates
within the institution of contract.

113. Karen Susman, Seven Tools for Managing Change in Every Area of Your
Life, 18 COM. L. BULL. 18, 18 (2003).
114. Id.
115. See Janet Weinstein & Linda Morton, Interdisciplinary Problem Solving
As A Context For Nurturing Intrinsic Values, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 839, 840–41
(2007).
116. Id.
117. See Korsgaard, supra note 15, at 101–03.
118. Our assessment of the relative weight of personal virtues is a clearly
normative question. See supra note 6.
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Promise Is Big and Small

Many scholars have linked promise to autonomy.119 The main
questions on the table have been: Should we acknowledge a
promissory principle, under which promisors can obligate themselves
to promisees by communicating an intention to do so? Or, formulated
somewhat differently, why are promises binding? The answers we
are given are largely compatible and persuasive on their own terms:
Promising is a valuable practice because it expands the range of
undertakings possible.120 It facilitates meaningful relationships of
trust and dependence.121 And it makes our normative position more
the product of our making.122 Given that it is a practice we can
endorse, we should recognize it. And because it cannot be sustained
if promisors break their promises, any given promisor is bound to
comply.123 In the Kantian line of argument used by Charles Fried,
free-riding on the practice would be to act on material and worldly
considerations instead of that part of ourselves that identifies with
universal reason.124 We would, moreover, be treating our promisee
as a means to our ends, failing to acknowledge her equal status as a
moral agent.
Some scholars have denied that promise successfully creates any
new obligation—the magic of promise, they would claim, really is just
magic.125 They do not deny that promisors are often required to keep
their promises but not because of any independent wrong derivative
from the promise principle.126 We should not lie so we should not
represent our intentions falsely. Even where we were sincere at the
time we issued the promise, we should not harm people by inducing
reliance and then failing to follow through. We should not betray
trust or the legitimate expectations that arise in relationships or as a
result of patterns of conduct. A promise skeptic would argue that we
have confused these reasons to keep promises—grounded in truth,
trust, and harm—with a bare reason to keep promises as such.
Promise skeptics must be right that there are many reasons for
keeping promises outside of the promissory principle. But they are
wrong that these reasons exhaust the force of promise. Although a
practice of promise is not necessary to sustain our self-conception as
119. FRIED, supra note 1, at 2; Kraus, supra note 1, at 1608; Daniel Markovits,
Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419 (2004); Joseph Raz,
Promises and Obligations, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
H.L.A. HART 210, 211 (Peter Michael Stephan Hacker & Joseph Raz eds., 1977).
120. Kraus, supra note 1, at 1648.
121. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1419–20; Raz, supra note 119, at 228.
122. FRIED, supra note 1, at 8; OWENS, supra note 3.
123. FRIED, supra note 1, at 9, 16.
124. KANT, supra note 16, at 14–15.
125. Heidi M. Hurd, The Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 121
(1996); see also DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 518 (Lewis Amherst
Selby-Bigge & Peter H. Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1740).
126. HUME, supra note 125, at 516–17.
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moral agents, it contributes to that picture. It is probably true that
for some people, moral agency does not hold any special significance.
Some people may also be quite bad at promising, handing them out
“willy-nilly” and then perpetually regretting them almost as quickly
as they are made. Others might react viscerally to obligation,
experience the totality of involuntary duty as almost unbearable, and
regard the prospect of assuming additional voluntary obligations
inconceivable. For all of these people, promise is a bad deal. But
surely there are others for whom the practice serves a positive moral
function. Since those who would reject promise do so largely for
reasons that involve a burden on themselves, they have the option of
opting out and avoiding most of its negative aspects.
Promise theorists appear to be right about the potential value of
promise to autonomy, both in the role it plays in establishing a
continuous identity and in the significance of the normative power.127
But they are wrong to think that this exhausts the relationship
between promise and autonomy. Promise presupposes just that
continuity which persistent agency tends to undermine. Instability
of identity reflects a competing moral value even in those for whom
promise is a valuable practice all things considered.
The dimension of autonomy that calls for continuous agency and
self-authorship constrains promise from the outside. Contrary to
Kimel, the practice does not have resources to account for the
challenge posed by this other dimension of autonomy.128 The value of
changing one’s mind lies precisely in rejecting the earlier
commitment, in asserting the right of the new self to revise the
normative relations created by the former self with new ones that
reflect present values. If the value of the initial promise lay in
“shaping the normative landscape” to match the promisor’s own
conception of the good, the value of revising the commitment lies in
reshaping that landscape to match a revised conception of the good.129
Both types of agency are essentially narcissistic—we want to see
ourselves in our obligations. We wish them to be rooted in our values.
In the making of a promise we may do this on clean ground. In the
rejection of a promise (and not just reconsideration of its merits in
light of new information), we react to ostensibly self-authored
obligations misaligned with our present self. There is no way to get
around the fact that the value of changing one’s mind is antithetical
to the promissory principle, notwithstanding their common origins in
our interest in moral agency.
It is not necessary, though, for promising to reconcile conflict in
the demands of agency within the practice. Agents must reconcile the
tenets of their own agency, and promise comprises but one moral
127. See Kimel, supra note 17; MacCormick & Raz, supra note 2, at 101.
128. See generally Kimel, supra note 17 (discussing personal autonomy and
promise).
129. OWENS, supra note 3.
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practice, one way in which we cultivate relations with others. We can
make it a larger or smaller part of our world on an individual basis.
Those more keen to create a stable self that consistently navigates
relations with others will often promise important things. Those for
whom the interest in breaking with past commitments is more salient
can avoid putting those commitments in promissory form except in
contexts where they desire continuity. The challenge of regret does
not disappear altogether, because we can revise our level of
commitment to stability itself. But when we come to regret a promise,
it is an unforced error. And we can each adjust our personal balance
between continuity and rupture one promise at a time.
B.

The Distinct Ambitions of Contract

Contract, though, is different. It does not just sit alongside an
array of moral practices. It is a legal relation that anticipates the use
of state power to enforce obligations.130 As such, it must reflect a more
expansive view of its subjects, one that incorporates both the value of
continuity and the value in fragmentation and instability.
As a legal institution, contract law must adopt a dual perspective.
It should take into account the social consequences of contract. But
it should also attend to the effects of the law on contracting parties as
subjects. Contract law should set up the context in which individuals
act in a way that makes it possible for them to act morally. As Shiffrin
has argued, taking morality into account does not entail
implementing it; it requires accommodation of the moral subject.131
More broadly, it requires that contract law operate in the background
to facilitate rather than undermine moral agency.
Moral agency is a complicated ideal, though, and the moral
subject is a complicated person.132
The law is faced with
accommodating any number of its aspects, some of which are
conflicting.133 Once one begins the project of accommodation, one is
enmeshed in rival views of the good. It is not that contract law should
not try to accommodate, only that it has to accommodate with
distance lest it end up burdening a moral subject operating by a
conception of the good disfavored by the people who make the rules.
One might expect contract to be still more insistent on continuity
and cohesion than promise because of the focus by the former on the
results of contract for others and their interest in being able to predict
and rely on the words and actions of promisors. It is no doubt true
that one of contract’s primary functions is to protect the interests of
others, including but not limited to promisees.134 But it does so more
130. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 721.
131. Id. at 716–17.
132. See id. at 741 (discussing the complexity of moral agency).
133. See id. at 717–19 (illustrating how the legal system should accommodate
moral agency).
134. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1457–58.

W03_BAGCHI.DOCX

26

(DO NOT DELETE)

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

4/21/18 7:39 PM

[Vol. 53

agnostically than promise theorists would have us believe. It does not
assume or promote a thick conception of the person, either by
insisting on promissory obligation or by protecting the private
practice. As I have elsewhere argued, contract has an internal logic
that is not just an elaboration of promise.135 The legal institution
protects the interests of others with indifference to the virtue of
promisors.136
This agnosticism of contract about the particular makeup of its
subject, beyond her basic moral capacities, is important because
partiality to one conception of the person at the expense of another
would burden the disadvantaged conception severely. If the view of
the person as fragmented and discontinuous is given short shrift
within the practice of promise, individuals who do not relate to that
practice’s priorities can minimize their participation in the practice
accordingly. But one cannot avoid participation in the institution of
contract without suffering substantial material disadvantage, if
indeed such avoidance is possible at all. Assuming one participates
in a market economy and therefore avails oneself of contract as a legal
instrument, one is subject to the material consequences attached to
legally binding agreements.137 Were the institution designed in a
manner that substantially favored the continuous and stable
conception of the person, those with a different conception would be
subject to a regime ill suited to them. That is not to say that contract
law might not have reason to penalize the behaviors associated with
discontinuity and fragmentation, but its reasons for attaching
material consequence to those behaviors should be based on their
material consequences for others. Contract should not invoke the
autonomy of promisors as justification for the burdens it places on the
discontinuous and fragmented conception of the person. If contract is
appropriately agnostic about the implications of autonomy for
promise, then it will not rely on the promissory principle as grounds
for enforcing contractual promises.
If contract poses greater risks for the discontinuous and
fragmented conception of the person, it is also uniquely positioned to
allow its expression. Notably, the point that follows is not that
contract can provide affirmative support for or otherwise favor that
conception at the expense of a stability conception—only that a
neutral contract law can accommodate fragmented identities in a way
that is valuable to those for whom that conception resonates.
Contracts are typically entered at arm’s length.138 That is, at
least, the assumption on which contract law proceeds.139 As Daniel
135. Aditi Bagchi, Separating Contract and Promise, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
709, 711–12 (2011).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 712.
139. Id.
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Markovits has observed, the norms that apply in contract are not the
ones we expect of intimates and, in fact, special rules apply where
contracting parties can establish that they do not stand at arm’s
length to each other.140
The impersonal relations of contract make it possible to limit the
dimensions on which we relate to contracting parties. That power is
especially important to those for whom agency implies value revision
and therefore instability of the self. The thinner the terms on which
we relate to others, the less our own instability implicates others and
the less likely we will be bound by terms we regret. For example, if
two parties plan a business transaction over a lengthy period, the
court will usually enforce only those terms that it has specific
evidence the parties wished to make enforceable.141 Agreements to
agree are not enforceable, and letters of intent must be shown to have
operated as legal documents in the understanding of the parties.142
The effect is to allow parties some latitude in the manner in which
they conduct themselves interpersonally without fear that they will
later be held to a term that might have seemed probable given their
expressed attitude at one moment in time.143 With a few exceptions,
parties are free to change their minds until they quite deliberately
forego that prerogative.144
Contract thus applies a light touch in its reconstruction of
parties’ contractual relationships. It does not impute norms unless
there is either objective evidence that the parties intended those
terms to be binding or if those terms implicate the material interests
of others.145 In an earlier work, Kimel argued for the value of personal
detachment and the role of contract in facilitating relationships at
140. Markovits, supra note 119, at 1437, 1457–58.
141. See, e.g., Alexandria Billiard Co. v. Miloslowsky, 149 N.W. 504, 508 (Iowa
1914) (“[A party] must show that all the conditions on his part have been complied
with, that the minds of the parties met upon all the terms and conditions of the
intended lease; and it must also appear that the proposed lessee was at fault in
not making the lease.”).
142. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wyman, 8 N.Y.S.3d 493, 494 (N.Y. App. Div.
2015) (“[An] agreement to agree, where [material] terms are left to future
negotiations, is unenforceable.”); see also Quake Const., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
565 N.E.2d 990, 993 (Ill. 1990) (assessing whether the letter of intent at hand
was an enforceable contract such that a cause of action may be brought by the
parties).
143. See, e.g., Feldman v. Allegheny Int’l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1221 (7th Cir.
1988) (“Neither party needed to fear that the other would mistake an almost
complete draft for a binding contract and try to foreclose the chance to change
one’s mind or negotiate further.”).
144. Id.
145. See Boatmen’s Bank of Mid-Missouri v. Crossroads W. Shopping Ctr.,
Ltd., 907 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (“When the parties to a contract
have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to determination of their
rights and duties, the term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied
by the Court. . . . [T]erms may be implied where necessary to give business
efficacy to the contract.”).
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arm’s length.146 By making it possible to coordinate, plan together,
and agree on terms without engaging one’s transactional partner in a
personal way, contract allows us to interact with others in a greater
variety of ways.147 Some of that variety, or our desire for it, will reflect
inconsistency in our own ends. In this way, contract’s presumption of
impersonal relations accommodates discontinuity and fragmentation.
Relationalists doubt both the empirical bases for and the
normative implications of the presumption of arm’s length relations
in contract.148 If parties to a contract have expectations beyond those
of the formal agreement, then arguably the informal norms that
govern their relation should inform courts’ construction of their legal
relation. Economic-minded relationalists like Robert Scott have
challenged this logic, observing that parties may specifically wish to
have separate legal and informal arrangements, in part because they
fear courts will get relational norms wrong.149 Similarly, Lisa
Bernstein has empirically shown that parties do not want or expect
courts to enforce all the norms of a trade, in part because courts poorly
decipher those norms.150 The argument here offers further grounds
for caution in enforcing norms that were not contemplated as terms;
enforcing those norms further constrains persons to remain true to
former selves and their values and preferences. Where the boundary
between legal and private norms is well delineated, the material
interests of contracting partners are protected without compromising
the interest in changing one’s mind.
The detachment of contract from promise, to some extent, flows
from its status as a legal institution.151 Optional moral practices can
serve one moral interest at the expense of another in a way that
legally coercive institutions should not. But a liberal state must be
especially sensitive to the dual demands of agency on contract.
According to the influential view articulated by John Rawls, one of
liberalism’s central tenets is that the state should avoid using its
coercive powers (including its private law regime) to favor one
conception of the good over another where both are reasonable and
146. DORI KIMEL, FROM PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARDS A LIBERAL THEORY OF
CONTRACT 134 (2003).
147. Id. at 78–80.
148. Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 654 (2010)
(“Although contracts between strangers are, of course, possible, relational
contract theory emphasizes that many contracts do not show this pattern of
‘strangership.’”).
149. See generally Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational
Contract, 94 NW. L. REV. 847 (2000) (reviewing the debate and outlining the core
arguments for and difficulties with alternative strategies for interpreting
relational contracts).
150. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765 (1996) (challenging the idea that courts should seek to discover and apply
immanent business norms in deciding cases).
151. See KIMEL, supra note 146, at 101.
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compatible with a common political conception of justice.152 Where
there are two rival conceptions that coexist within persons but which
we can expect to balance out differently across persons, the state
should be careful not to implicitly invoke one as a basis for law.
The reasons for a liberal state to avoid favoring the stability
conception of the person are not just negative. Because both that
conception and the discontinuity conception of the person are so
closely bound up with a quest for moral agency, liberal states have
affirmative reason to accommodate both. There is a thin line between
neutrality and accommodation;153 it is a dilemma that rears its head
in many parts of law. But the line that a liberal regime of contract
should walk—between favoring a view of the person and
accommodating it—is familiar, however difficult it may be to identify
in practice.
V. ACCOMMODATING PERSISTENT AGENCY
Due to its strong resemblance to an ordinary exchange of
promises, even more so than other areas of law, contract might appear
to treat us “as if” we were a single person. But modern contract law
avoids this presumption in a number of respects. The legal regime of
contract manages to allow us to operate on a fiction of stability and
cohesion vis-à-vis our contracting partners without itself assuming
this attitude of contracting parties.
Many features of modern contract law accommodate
fickleness.154 I will discuss an illustrative set: the principle of
objectivity, pervasive construction, the requirement of consideration,
the duty to mitigate, the “American rule” on litigation costs, and the
possibility of bankruptcy.
In none of these cases do I claim that the legal rule was motivated
by a view about personhood or any deliberate design on the part of
judges to remain neutral among competing views of personhood. At
best, the intuitive normative appeal of these legal rules is bolstered
by their compatibility with fickleness.
At the least, their
compatibility is a fortuitous moral advantage.
First, the principle of objectivity155 gives the law a focal point
apart from the subjective persons that make contract. By making the
words and actions of parties the bases for contract, not actual
agreement, the law can remain agnostic as to the makeup of
contracting parties and need not pick and choose among potential
views of contracting subjects. Inquiry into subjective intent or the
purposes parties bring to contract requires speculation about what
contracting parties were actually thinking. It assumes that each
152.
153.
154.
155.
79 (Mo.

RAWLS, supra note 61, at 135–40.
See id.
See infra notes 164, 166, 177, 180 and accompanying text.
See Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777, 778–
Ct. App. 1907).
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party had an articulable belief about the content of an agreement or
a fixed purpose with respect to it. Fickle people lack such beliefs and
purposes.156 Any attribution will accidentally privilege those aspects
of a party’s beliefs that she or the other party can document. One
might worry that the principle of objectivity is similarly arbitrary in
giving weight only to the intention that a person happens to
communicate. But communication of intent is a morally significant
act, both because of the potential for reliance and because of the
control a party exercises over her communicative acts. The principle
of objectivity is defensible just on the grounds that parties rely on
each other’s objective intent. But it is also the only version of intent
that does not presuppose a false and narrow view of the person whose
intent is at issue. And it is the rule that renders contractual
obligation most likely to reflect an intention to legally obligate oneself
(i.e., a choice to prioritize the advantages of a continuous self over a
discontinuous one in a given context).
Modern contract law also acknowledges the limits of agreement
through pervasive construction.157 Greg Klass has discussed our
common mischaracterization of many acts of construction in contract
as interpretation.158
Although snuck in under the label of
interpretation, default rules commonly supply terms where
agreement is absent.159 By now, we expect ordinary agreements to be
riddled with important gaps.160 Economists think of these gaps as the
product of transaction costs, including incomplete information about
future contingencies and the cost of negotiating terms and drafting
text that specifies obligations clearly.161 We can also explain such
gaps by way of parties’ uncertainty over their own ends and
priorities.162 That uncertainty will amplify each of the classic
156. In Flower City Painting Contractors, Inc. v. Gumina Constr. Co., a
contractor and his subcontractor differently understood the latter’s painting
duties. 591 F.2d 162, 163–64 (2d Cir. 1979). Neither party suspected this
difference. Id. Finding the intentions of the parties uncertain, the court held
that there was no enforceable contract. Id. at 164.
157. See, e.g., Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1: Francis Lieber,
NEW PRIVATE L., (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19
/interpretation-and-construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass/ (describing the
interplay between construction and interpretation and describing that
construction, for Lieber, serves a gap-filling and equitable function).
158. See generally Gregory Klass, Interpretation and Construction in
Contract
Law
(Jan.
2018)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2971
&context=facpub (examining the distinction between contract interpretation and
contract construction and the complex relationship between the two activities).
159. Id. at 12.
160. See Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 277 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
161. Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the
Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 188–95 (2005).
162. Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 396, 413 (2009).
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transaction costs; it will be that much harder to know what weight to
give factual uncertainty where our ranking of possible states of the
world is uncertain. It is more costly to work out terms with a partner
where neither party has stable preferences, especially with respect to
remote contingencies. The exercise of specification that drafting
usually entails forces parties to resolve vagueness, but that
vagueness has to be resolved internally before it can be worked out
between parties.163 More generally, we might attribute gaps in
contractual agreement to the limits of intersubjective
intelligibility.164 That is, we never really know what other people are
talking about—not completely.165 But this limitation is itself a byproduct (in part) of intrasubjective fragmentation and discontinuity.
We cannot reach full agreement because neither of us can be counted
on to have a stable and coherent belief about anything complex, as
transactions often are. Under these conditions, subjective agreement
will be fleeting and complete agreement illusory. Modern contract
law requires neither.166 It is increasingly tolerant of incomplete
agreement and prepared to supply defaults that produce workable,
enforceable agreements even in the absence of mutual
understanding.167
Third, the bargain principle, as expressed in the requirement of
consideration, identifies those commitments that we are not entitled
to revise in light of the interests of others.168 It is the doctrine that
best shows contract to be about something other than promise;
promises are not enforceable unless they are part of an exchange.169
Kimel suggests that the requirement of consideration identifies those
promises which promisors are least likely to regret.170 It is not clear
why one is less likely to regret an agreement of exchange than a
unilateral commitment, but it is clear why the state should be more
interested in holding one to a planned exchange. Those reasons have
to do with the harm one can do to contracting partners and the
interest of the public in a system of commercial exchange in which
complex transactions can be executed and relied upon. Those reasons
eschew a thick view of the person and the reasons a party may have

163. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 161, at 196–98.
164. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law, Morals, and Ethics, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 447,
450 (1995) (defining “intersubjective intelligibility” as “a rule written by one
person can be substantially understood by another”).
165. Cf. id.
166. Omri Ben-Shahar, Agreeing to Disagree: Filing Gaps in Deliberately
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389, 393–94 (2004).
167. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989).
168. Kirksey v. Kirksey, 8 Ala. 131, 133 (1845) (refusing to enforce a promise
for lack of consideration); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Principles of Consideration, 67
CORNELL L. REV. 640, 641 (1982).
169. Eisenberg, supra note 168, at 640.
170. Kimel, supra note 17, at 114.
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for wanting to be regarded as bound and focus instead on the rights
of others to have her bound.
Fourth, the duty to mitigate in contract minimizes the burden of
breach to that necessary to protect a material interest of the
promisee.171 Qua promisor, the breaching party may not be entitled
to enlist the nonbreaching party in whatever change of plans resulted
in her breach.172 But as an agent, the breaching party has an interest
in changing her mind.173 The duty to mitigate protects that interest
and in doing so accommodates an aspect of her agency for which her
position as promisor alone does not account.174
Fifth, plaintiffs face systematically undercompensatory
damages.175 Notwithstanding the refrain that the standard remedy
for breach of contract—expectation damages—is intended to make
the plaintiff whole,176 nonbreaching parties are not indifferent as
between performance and damages from the other party.177 Expected
court damages fall below actual expectation as the result of the
general rule that damages are limited to the actual,178 foreseeable,179
and reasonable loss that plaintiff can prove.180 The voluntary payoff
offered to a nonbreaching party may be lower still.181 Even where
limiting doctrines do not ultimately apply, expected damages must be
discounted for uncertainty about whether those doctrines will apply
(or whether a court may be persuaded that they do) and whether a
court will otherwise err in its calculation of damages.182 Plaintiffs
171. M. Golodetz Export Corp. v. S/S Lake Anja, 751 F.2d 1103, 1112 (2d Cir.
1985).
172. Shiffrin, supra note 36, at 724–25.
173. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Actual and Virtual Specific Performance, the
Theory of Efficient Breach, and the Indifference Principle in Contract Law, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 975, 980 (2005).
174. Joseph William Singer, Starting Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 565, 576
(2002).
175. Debora L. Threedy, Liquidated and Limited Damages and the Revision
of Article 2: An Opportunity to Rethink the U.C.C.’s Treatment of Agreed
Remedies, 27 IDAHO L. REV. 427, 452 (1990).
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, intro. note (AM. LAW.
INST. 1981) (“The traditional goal of the law of contract remedies . . . [is]
compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach.”).
177. Michael D. Knobler, Note, A Dual Approach to Contract Remedies, 30
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 415, 427 (2012).
178. Inshaustegui v. 666 5th Ave. Ltd. P’ship, 706 N.Y.S.2d 396, 400 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2000) (limiting recovery to actual outlay).
179. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 147–48 (enshrining the
foreseeability rule).
180. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)
(“A party cannot recover damages for breach of a contract for loss beyond the
amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty.”).
181. William K. Carr & Robert L. Liebross, Wrongs Without Rights: The Need
for a Strong Federal Common Law of ERISA, 4 STAN. L. & POLY’ REV. 221, 223–
24 (1993).
182. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005) (identifying judicial error costs
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may not be able to document the full extent of their losses, especially
where those losses involve lost profits.183
Still, other losses are irrecoverable. There is limited recovery for
transaction costs—most notably, the costs of litigation.184 It is the
American rule that litigants presumptively bear their own costs.185
Nonpecuniary damages are disallowed in most cases.186 Damages in
cases of substantial performance,187 or where performance is deemed
“wasteful,”188 are limited to diminishment in market value. Equitable
doctrines of rescission that allow the breaching party to avoid
damages may also be regarded as limitations on remedy.189 The
result is that expected damages rarely make a nonbreaching party
whole.190
Incomplete remedies effectively weaken the coercive means by
which contract law motivates parties to perform. It goes farther than
most of the other doctrines discussed here in that it accommodates
the moral interest in changing one’s mind at the material expense of
the breaching party. While the competing interests of agency are too
vague to justify any particular distribution of costs, incomplete
damages have the effect of penalizing fickleness less harshly than
would more complete remedies.
The same can be said of our final example, the institution of
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is also a particularly interesting example
because cross-national variation in leniency seems to reflect cultural
and political undercurrents.191 It might be that, though stability and
as among the costs of contract); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific
Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 277 (1979) (noting that damage awards are often
undercompensatory).
183. Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. Am. Steel & Aluminum Corp., 498 A.2d 339,
347 (N.H. 1985) (refusing to award speculative lost profits).
184. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975).
185. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d).
186. See Bohac v. Dep’t of Agric., 239 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding
that ordinary contract damages exclude “emotional damages” because the scope
of emotional suffering is unforeseeable).
187. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 892 (N.Y. 1921)
(establishing the doctrine of substantial performance).
188. See Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla.
1962) (refusing full recovery because the cost of performance was
disproportionate in relation to the market value of land at issue).
189. Doctrines relating to defects in formation, such as mistake,
misrepresentation, and duress, as well as those relating to changed
circumstances, such as impracticability or frustration of purpose, clearly have
other justifications. But this is true of most doctrines discussed in this Part.
What matters here is that the effect of these defenses is to reduce the cost of
changing one’s mind, especially since a potential defense can be the basis for a
low settlement even where it ultimately lacks merit.
190. See supra note 189.
191. See generally BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE
AGE OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2009) (documenting the turn to a distinctly
American attitude toward debt and its relation to cultural shifts).
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instability rival each other in every person and in every culture, the
American narrative of self-reinvention makes our own culture
especially solicitous of fickleness.192 Remaking yourself, which
necessarily involves casting off the vestiges of the self you reject, is a
classic American ideal. Popular culture is rife with narratives of
redemption. Sometimes these are stories about fickle individuals who
learn to walk the line, but sometimes they are stories about stiff,
repressed people who are liberated and come to see the value in
spontaneity and change. Both types of evolution are celebrated but,
in the balance of classic and modern virtues, Americans may lean
more than others toward the latter.
One might also speculate that elites identify with the classic
virtues more than those unhappy with their lot, and perhaps their
values do not dominate American legal culture as pervasively as
elsewhere.193 This could be either because of a populist strain in
American law (at least bankruptcy law), or just a more liberal one.194
That is, maybe the state more steadfastly avoids favoring continuity
as an ideal over a conception of the person as always a work in
progress. As noted, these possibilities are merely speculative and
their empirical premises are highly contestable. But the fact of crossnational variation at least reinforces the idea that people legitimately
vary on this dimension and calls out for an account of the relationship
between agency and commitment over time richer than the one
promissory theory has provided us thus far.
It is characteristic of promissory theory generally, though
especially of its earlier development by Fried, that it is oddly centered
on the promisor and her autonomy.195 Even if contract serves the
principle of autonomy—and by recognizing normative powers, it does,
among other purposes—contract law does not rest enforceability of
private agreements on a particular theory of how promising serves
autonomy.196 It does not rest on promise per se. To do so would have
contract adopt the animating values of that practice at the expense of
other values, like the value of changing one’s mind, that the legal
institution needs to accommodate too. Of course, one is not free to
change one’s mind in contract as we know it.197 But the apparent
reasons for restricting that aspect of agency have to do with the moral
claims of others, not some rival dimension of the promisor’s own
agency. Our moral interest in changing our minds does not generate
a right to harm others, but it does generate a reason not to have courts
hold us to our commitments for our own sake.

192. See HARRE, supra note 11.
193. See MANN, supra note 191, at 257–58.
194. See Iain Ramsay, Interest Groups and the Politics of Consumer
Bankruptcy Reform in Canada, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 379, 384 (2003).
195. FRIED, supra note 1.
196. Id. at 16.
197. Id. at 15.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Contracts are bilateral relationships and much of their
normative dynamic centers on what contracting parties owe each
other.198 But the choice by each contracting party to enter a contract,
as well as the choice to perform it, also reflects her separate moral
life, including her own plans and priorities. These two normative
frameworks, one bilateral and one single-agent-centered, intersect in
promissory accounts of contract. Promissory theories regard contract
as a species of promise.199 Promise creates an obligation to another
person, but we accept promises as binding in the first place because
they promote individual autonomy.200 This Article has examined the
latter contention (i.e., that promises promote autonomy). I have
elaborated the ways in which self-created obligations that sustain
over time undermine persistent agency, which is a premise of
autonomy as it is construed in most contract theory. The tension
between our interest in the normative power of promise, on the one
hand, and our interest in allowing persistent agency its mark, on the
other, cannot be diffused within the practice of promise. But promise
is a private practice into which people can opt in or out as they see fit.
Extending its logic into the coercive domain of contract is more
problematic.
We enter into employment contracts expecting work of a
particular kind to give meaning to our life. We enter into a residential
lease in order to live in a certain way—in a given place, with
particular other people (or not). We buy products or sign up for
services because we prefer those goods and services over others, and
we express something about ourselves by spending our money in
those ways. Contract, like promise, is enormously powerful because
it enables us to coordinate with others in service of our values and
plans. But sometimes we change our minds and those contracts turn
out to be disempowering. This does not mean we should get out of
them; after all, contract is bilateral and other people’s interests are
at stake. But we cannot ground our legal obligation to abide by those
contracts in a promissory morality that radically privileges our earlier
agenda over our new values and projects.
My claims are not radical. I have not claimed that we cannot be
described as continuous persons over time in any metaphysical sense.
Nor have I suggested that our values and plans do not span time.201

198. Christine Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective
on Contract Modification, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 203 (1997).
199. See generally FRIED, supra note 1, at 7–8 (discussing promise as a theory
of contractual obligation); Shiffrin, supra note 1, at 496 n.30 (treating promise
and contract as interchangeable).
200. FRIED, supra note 1.
201. Cf. Samuel Scheffler, Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person,
12 CAN. J. PHIL. 229, 237 (1982) (“Morality as we normally think of it is intimately
bound up with a conception of ourselves as agents existing over time with ongoing
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Indeed, the idea of a life plan for the moment is incoherent. The
picture of the person I have drawn instead is familiar: We endorse
values that apply over the course of our lives, and we make plans that
can only be realized over time. However, we revise our values and we
revise our plans, and then those new values and plans stretch out into
the future, no less vulnerable to revision than those that they
replaced.
I have argued that people are fickle in this way and also that we
should endorse this aspect of ourselves as reflective of moral agency.
How much we endorse it and how much weight we give to this
dimension of moral agency amounts to our conception of the person.
We share a conception inasmuch as we all value stability to some
extent and change to some extent. We diverge inasmuch we attach
different weight to those values.
Promise prioritizes a stable picture of the self over its fickle rival,
but contract ought not to similarly prioritize moral stability over
moral evolution. Although the interests of others limit our right to
change our minds, contract law avoids any parochial view of moral
agency and declines to promote a stable conception of the person as
an ideal in itself. It is not for contract law to promote a personal ideal
of internal stability and coherence any more than it would be
appropriate for private law to promote a dynamic, pluralistic
worldview. Liberalism is associated with a special solicitude for
autonomy,202 but we should regard agnosticism about the
implications of autonomy for self-commitment as the true liberal
imperative in contract.

values, plans, personalities, loyalties, and commitments.”). The arguments of
this Article are not inconsistent with this claim but grapple with the tension
between the continuity of our moral agency (persistent agency) and the continuity
of its work-product (any given set of values and plans).
202. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Autonomy, Liberalism and the New
Contractualism, 18 LAW CONTEXT: SOCIO-LEGAL J. 57, 57–58 (2000) (discussing
liberalism and autonomy).

